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“The terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts)
were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and liberties
specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all
persons.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has undermined its Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence by conflating the distinction between implied
rights and unenumerated rights. Broadly speaking, implied rights are
those that, based on a reasonable interpretation of the text, are inferable
from the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights. This includes, for
example, the right to associate under the First Amendment and the right
to “effective” assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 2
Essentially, implied rights are ancillary to and necessary for the full
realization of the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights’ express
provisions. Conversely, unenumerated fundamental rights, such as the
right to privacy and the right to make consensual sexual choices, 3 exist
independently of the Constitution’s text but have the same force as
enumerated rights.
This Article argues that the Court’s failure to distinguish between
implied and unenumerated rights is traceable to its misplaced reliance on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than on the
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, when
creating new rights. 4 The Due Process Clause ensures that citizens are
not deprived of life, liberty, or property without fair processes, whereas

1. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to effective assistance of
counsel); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (right to association); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(right to association).
3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a law banning sodomy
between same-sex couples).
4. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”); U.S. CONST., amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); see also Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (holding that “[a]lthough a literal reading of the Clause
might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty,
for at least 105 years . . . the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as
well”).
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the Ninth Amendment guarantees, and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects, unenumerated fundamental rights existing
independently of the Constitution. 5 Given that many fundamental rights
relating to privacy and liberty, such as the right engage in consensual
sexual conduct and to have pre-viability abortions, are not inferable from
the text of the Due Process Clause (or any other provision), they should
have been characterized as unenumerated, not implied, rights and
grounded in the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 6 The point, therefore, is not to say that the right to abortion is
not a fundamental right. It is to say that the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause are the proper means by which to
recognize such rights. 7
By adopting this framework and distinguishing between implied
and unenumerated rights, the Court would have anchored its
fundamental rights jurisprudence more firmly in the Constitution’s text
without unduly constraining its authority to address abuses of the
democratic process. 8 As discussed below, this framework is consistent
with the Constitution’s structural provisions, including the Supremacy
Clause and the selective incorporation doctrine, 9 which establish a
system of federalism that ensures equal enjoyment of fundamental rights
and harmony between the federal and state court systems. 10
If the Court anchors unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause it will create a three-tiered
fundamental rights paradigm that protects express, implied, and
unenumerated rights. Currently, only the first two categories have been
5. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
6. See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) (holding that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”); Planned Parenthood,
505 U.S. 833 (affirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (holding that
the states may not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy).
7. See U.S. CONST., amend. IX; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See U.S. CONST., amend. IX; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
9. See U.S. CONST., art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010) (recognizing a
“process of ‘selective incorporation,’ [in which] the Court began to hold that the Due Process
Clause incorporates rights contained in the first eight Amendments”).
10. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “the
terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their counterparts) were understood to refer to those
fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all
persons”) (internal citation omitted).
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extensively developed by the Court, in part because in Griswold v.
Connecticut 11 the Court conflated implied and unenumerated rights
when holding that the right to privacy was among those that emanate
from penumbras 12 in the text. Had the Court relied more heavily on the
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it would
have established a rights-creating framework that was capable of broader
application than its current due process formulation. The Table below
sets forth a proposed, three-tiered paradigm for recognizing express,
implied, and unenumerated rights.
THE THREE CATEGORIES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

TYPE OF
RIGHT
SOURCE(S)

EXPRESS

IMPLIED

UNENUMERATED

THE BILL OF
RIGHTS

DERIVED
FROM THE
FIRST EIGHT
AMENDMENTS
TO ENSURE
FULL
ENJOYMENT OF
EXPRESS
RIGHTS

THE NINTH
AMENDMENT
AND THE
PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE, WHICH

POSITIVE

FREE SPEECH,

AND

THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS,
THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL,
FREEDOM
FROM CRUEL
AND
UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT

NEGATIVE
RIGHTS
(EXAMPLES)

FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION,
EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

GUARANTEE
RIGHTS “IMPLICIT
IN THE CONCEPT
OF ORDERED
LIBERTY”
THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, PREVIABILITY
ABORTION, AND
CONSENSUAL
SEXUAL
CONDUCT.

This framework disentangles implied rights from unenumerated
rights, situates the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities
11.
12.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id.
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Clause as the sources of unenumerated rights, and eliminates the Due
Process Clause from fundamental rights jurisprudence. The result is a
jurisprudence more closely aligned with the text that enables the Court
to redress abuses that occur in the democratic and political process.
As the chart illustrates, the proposed framework would provide that
express rights derive from the Bill of Rights. Implied rights also derive
from the first eight amendments, and those rights function to ensure full
enjoyment of the Constitution’s express rights. The primary change to
the Court’s current taxonomy would be to recognize unenumerated
rights as arising from the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, which together guarantee rights “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.” 13 This framework, as developed later, would
mean that unenumerated rights currently recognized as part of the
Court’s Substantive Due Process jurisprudence would, instead, be
understood as deriving from the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Recognizing the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as the source of the Constitution’s
unenumerated rights would also provide a basis to recognize other
unenumerated rights that are implicit in a free society.
Part II provides historical background regarding the Court’s power
to create unenumerated rights, and focuses on the selective incorporation
doctrine, the Supremacy and the Privileges or Immunities Clauses, and
the Ninth Amendment. Part III argues that the Court should overrule the
Slaughter-House Cases and interpret the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to create principled yet restrained
unenumerated rights jurisprudence.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: SELECTIVE INCORPORATION,
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND THE FEDERAL POWER TO CREATE
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
The selective incorporation doctrine and Supremacy Clause are the
centerpieces of cooperative federalism. 14 These, along with the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, create a
jurisprudence that supports judicial recognition of unenumerated rights.

13. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
14. See generally, Sarah C. Rispin, Cooperative Federalism and Constructive Waiver of State
Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2003).
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The Selective Incorporation Doctrine

Originally, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal
Government. 15 In U.S. v. Cruikshank, 16 the Court held that the right to
bear arms under the Second Amendment “means no more than that it
shall not be infringed by Congress.” 17 In subsequent cases, however, the
Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to
apply some provisions in the Bill of Rights to the states. In De Jonge v.
Oregon, 18 the Court held that the right to peaceably assemble under the
First Amendment was a “fundamental righ[t] . . . safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 19 Likewise, in Chicago,
B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 20 the Court applied the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause to the states when it held that property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation. 21 As Justice Alito stated in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 22 the Court “viewed the due process
question as entirely separate from the question whether a right was a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship.” 23
In McDonald, however, the Court was careful to note the rights
“protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause were
only those that were ‘of such a nature that they are included in the
conception of due process of law.’” 24 Put differently, although “it was
‘possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against National action [might] also be safeguarded against
state action,’” 25 this was “not because those rights are enumerated in the
first eight Amendments.” 26
In identifying “the boundaries of due process,” 27 the Court has

15. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010) (citing Barron v. City of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)).
16. 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that the Second Amendment only applied to the federal
government); see also Miller v. Tex., 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 265
(1886).
17. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
18. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
19. Id. at 364.
20. 166 U.S. 226, 248 (1897).
21. Id.
22. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 743 (2010).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 759 (quoting Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1999)); see also Adamson v. Cal.,
332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 U.S. (1936); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. McDonald 561 U.S. at 760 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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relied on the “immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very
idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard.” 28 In Palko v. Connecticut, 29 the Court held that the Due
Process Clause protects rights that are “the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty” 30 and essential to “a fair and enlightened system of
justice.” 31 This includes rights that are “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 32 In Duncan
v. Louisiana, 33 the Court framed the fundamental rights inquiry as
whether “a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the
particular protection.” 34
On the other hand, the Court is “not hesitant to hold that a right set
out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test for inclusion within the
protection of the Due Process Clause.”35 For example, the Court has
refused to incorporate the privilege against self-incrimination and the
requirement of a grand jury indictment in criminal cases. 36 Significantly,
even where the Court incorporates a provision in the Bill of Rights, the
remedies for violations of that right may differ at the federal and state
level. For example, at the federal level criminal defendants are entitled
to counsel in all criminal cases, whereas the states are required to
provide counsel for convictions that, absent counsel, would be “lacking
in . . . fundamental fairness.” 37
B.The Supremacy Clause and Cooperative Federalism
The Supremacy Clause is set forth in Article VI, Clause 2, and
states in relevant part as follows:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-

28. Id.
29. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
30. Id. at 325.
31. Id.
32. Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
33. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
34. Id. at 149, n.14.
35. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761 (2010).
36. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Cal., 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
37. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), rev’d on other grounds by Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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38

It is well-settled that “federal law is as much the law of the several
States as are the laws passed by their legislatures” 39 and that “federal
and state law ‘together form one system of jurisprudence,’ . . . having
jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.” 40 As such,
state courts have a “coordinate responsibility to enforce that law
according to their regular modes of procedure.” 41 This includes an
affirmative duty “to safeguard and enforce the right of every citizen
without reference to the particular exercise of governmental power from
which the right may have arisen, if only the authority to enforce such
right comes generally within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by
the government creating them.” 42
Several principles inform the Court’s Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence. First, “[a] state court may not deny a federal right, when
the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of
‘valid excuse.’” 43 Second, the Clause prohibits state courts from
disregarding federal law based on a policy disagreement.44 In Howlett v.
Rose, 45 the Court stated as follows:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible because it presupposes what in
legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of
the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke
for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy
for all. That policy is as much the policy of [the State] as if the act had
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected according46
ly in the courts of the State.

However, state courts may refuse to exercise jurisdiction if the
reason for doing so is “a neutral state rule regarding the administration
of the courts.” 47
38. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, Cl. 2.
39. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734 (2009) (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130, 136-37 (1876)).
40. Id. at 734-35
41. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).
42. Id. at 367-68 (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222
(1916)).
43. Id. at 370 (quoting Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929)).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 371 (quoting Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)).
47. Id. at 372.
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The Court’s precedent establishes that “when state or local law
conflicts with federal law, federal law prevails” 48 even though the
federal law should not be interpreted to “endorse every potential remedy
for violation of that rule.” 49 Additionally, federal law can preempt state
law “where Congress has expressly preempted state law; where
Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an
entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law; or where
federal law conflicts with state law.” 50 These principles enable the type
of federalism where federal and state courts collectively enforce the
rights created under federal law. 51
State courts are typically not bound, however, by decisions of the
lower federal courts. In U.S. ex. rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 52 the Seventh
Circuit held that “the state courts and the lower federal courts have the
same responsibility and occupy the same position; there is a parallelism
but not paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the same
reviewing authority of the [U.S. Supreme Court].” 53 The court stated as
follows:
Finality of determination in respect to the laws of the United States
rests in the Supreme Court of the United States. Until the Supreme
Court of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded
from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal law.
They are not precluded by, though they should give respectful consideration to, the decisions of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and
54
District Courts.

Conversely, some courts have held that decisions of the lower
federal courts are binding on the states. 55
As a practical matter, the latter view makes more sense.
Unnecessary conflict and incongruity would result between the state and
federal courts, particularly because the U.S. Supreme Court hears very
few cases each year. 56 In fact, the Supreme Court supervisory authority
has changed substantially in recent years:
48. Planned Parenthood of Kan. and Mid-Missouri v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 823 (10th Cir.
2014).
49. Id.
50. Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 531 (3d Cir. 2006).
51. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372-73.
52. 432 F. 2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970).
53. Id. at 1075 (quoting State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402-03 (1965)).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Handy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 So. 530 (1935).
56. See Success Rate of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, Supreme
Court Press, http://www.supremecourtpress.com/chance_of_success.html.
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In the nation’s formative years, state courts were subject to as-of-right
review in the Supreme Court for denying any federal claim of right.
For many years, the Supreme Court had the capacity to review most
major state court decisions on questions of federal law and thus served
as a general supervisor of the state courts. Today, the Supreme Court
reviews an average of only twelve state court decisions each term,
meaning that “state courts . . . exercise final authority in virtually every federal question case that comes before them.” In this changed
world, the lower federal courts arguably should take the lead in interpreting federal law, even if that was not the role initially intended for
57
them.

Indeed, state courts “play a vastly different role in the adjudication
of federal issues than they did during the early Republic” 58 because they
now “enjoy far greater decisional independence.” 59
Thus, if state courts refused to follow the decisions of lower federal
courts, the principles underlying cooperative federalism and the
Supremacy Clause would all but vanish and be displaced by irresolvable
conflicts between the state and federal courts over the meaning of
federal law. As a result, citizens would be “left confused about what the
law requires of them and sometimes bear the added costs of complying
with two (or more) different legal standards.” 60 The Court foresaw this
problem in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee 61 where it emphasized “the
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the
whole United States” 62 and “decried the ‘mischiefs’ that would result
were the Supreme Court deprived of its ability to ensure such uniformity
by reviewing state court decisions on federal questions.” 63 As Professor
Frost notes, the “disuniformity created by a split between a state
supreme court and its regional federal court of appeals is especially
problematic because it leaves citizens in a single state subject to
conflicting legal standards.” 64
57. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal
Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 75 (2015) (internal
citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 92.
61. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
62. Frost, supra note 57, at 92 (emphasis in original) (quoting Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S.at 347-48 (1916)).
63. Id. at 93.
64. Id. Professor Frost explains as follows:
This type of intrastate disuniformity has always been viewed as a serious problem. It was
the impetus for the Erie doctrine, in which the Court rejected the rule of Swift v. Ty-
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Furthermore, permitting state and federal courts to interpret the
Constitution differently disregards “the equality principle of treating like
cases alike and weaken[s] the integrity of the law itself by suggesting its
meaning is not immutable.” 65 In addition, “[t]he divergence between
state and federal courts will inevitably . . . caus[e] some to question the
competence of state courts (or, less likely, federal courts) and creating
tension between the two systems.” 66 Simply put, the Constitution’s text,
and practical realities about contemporary judicial review, “supports the
conclusion that the lower federal courts are superior to state courts when
interpreting federal law.” 67
Most importantly, absent a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
enforcement of fundamental enumerated rights would be made difficult,
if not impossible. Consider what would happen if a federal appeals court
affirmed a district court’s ruling recognizing the right to assisted suicide
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. If all or some of the states
refused to follow the circuit court’s decision, then the right to assisted
suicide would exist in name only unless the Court intervened or
Congress acted. Likewise, if lower federal courts recognized a right to
pre-viability abortion, but some states did not, then citizens living in a
state that prohibited abortion would be denied the right entirely.
In such a scenario, the state and federal courts would cease to share
to responsibility in the collective enforcement of federal law and thus
permanently alter our system of cooperative federalism. This would
make every state’s constitution, and interpretations thereof by state court
judges, equal if not superior to the federal constitution and give states
nearly unchecked authority to disparage or completely disregard
son because it “prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the state.”
Avoiding intrastate disuniformity was also the basis for the Supreme Court’s holding
in Van Dusen v. Barrack that a transferee court must apply the same state law that would
have been applied by the transferor court, and for the decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co., that federal courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which they sit. And it explains why every federal court of appeals has adopted a
rule requiring three-judge panels to follow the precedent set by a previous panel within
the same circuit. Our federal judicial system is willing to tolerate disuniformity among the federal courts of appeals but not disuniformity within a geographic region. A rule requiring that state courts follow precedent set by the regional federal court of appeals would similarly serve that goal.
Id.
65. Id. (stating that “if a federal law means ‘X’ when interpreted by one court but ‘Y’ when
interpreted by another, then the public might presume that the courts are ‘unprincipled,’
incompetent, or that legal reasoning is ‘indeterminate,’ which ‘subverts the courts’ efforts to be seen
as oracles of exogenous, objective, and determinant legal principles”).
66. Id. at 96.
67. Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
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enumerated, implied, and unenumerated rights. Furthermore, the
Supremacy Clause and incorporation doctrine would have no force
absent a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court or the enactment of federal
legislation. This is not to say that state courts lack the power to interpret
the federal constitution differently than federal courts.68 It is to say that,
when states begin disregarding decisions of the lower federal courts,
they can, in effect, undermine our entire system of cooperative
federalism and deny basic freedoms that are “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.” 69
These problems were exemplified in Ex parte State of Alabama ex
rel. Alabama Policy Institute, 70 where the Alabama Supreme Court held
that a decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Alabama invalidating the state’s ban on same-sex marriage
was not binding on probate judges. 71 After the Eleventh Circuit and U.S.
Supreme Court refused to intervene and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari, the Alabama Supreme Court granted original jurisdiction and
issued a writ of mandamus instructing its probate judges to deny
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 72 In doing so, the Court ignored
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had already granted certiorari in
another case to decide the fate of same-sex marriage bans nationwide. 73
Technically, the Alabama Supreme Court was correct that state courts
are not bound by decisions of lower federal courts, but as a practical
matter, if the Alabama Supreme Court’s approach were to become
common practice, federal courts would essentially be stripped of their
power to invalidate state laws that violate express and implied
constitutional rights. 74 States would be able nullify the rulings of all
federal courts but one.
Ultimately, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision is an example

68. Id. at 93.
69. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding the right to assisted
suicide was not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. See Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460 (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/257589071/1140460-Petition-Granted.
71. Id. at 39-40, 133.
72. Id. at 133.
73. See Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 26, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/.
74. The Court has, through the Erie and abstention doctrines, tried to ensure harmony
between state and federal courts. See Daniel C. Norris, The Final Frontier of Younger Abstention:
The Judiciary’s Abdication of the Federal Court Removal Jurisdiction Statute, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 193, 195 (2003) (noting that “the related principles of comity and federalism require
the federal courts to recognize the independence of state institutions and not interfere with
legitimate state functions, even for the purpose of enforcing federal rights”).
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of the disharmony that results when states refuse to follow lower federal
court rulings. Professor Frost underscores the benefits of a system where
state court defers to federal court decisions:
[T]he Madisonian Compromise and the norm of concurrent state court jurisdiction
over federal questions
suggest
that
state courts are constitutionally adequate fora for the resolution
of federal claims, but the fact that state courts are essential expositors
of federal law does not render them federal courts’ equals when doing
so. State courts lack the resources, experience, and insulation from political pressure that federal courts enjoy—problems that the Framers of
the Constitution recognized and that continue to exist today. Furthermore, the expansion of the size and jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts over the last two hundred years, coupled with
diminished opportunities for Supreme Court review, suggest that
the state courts should be more deferential to the federal courts of ap75
peals.

Simply put, “a state court should not be free to disregard its own
regional court of appeals when addressing the meaning of federal law.” 76
C.Express, Implied, and Unenumerated Rights
The selective incorporation doctrine and Supremacy Clause give
the U.S. Supreme Court authority to create express, implied, and
unenumerated rights. Currently, however, the Court only recognizes
express and implied rights because it erroneously includes unenumerated
rights within the latter category. The Court’s three-tiered framework for
creating and enforcing fundamental rights is described in the table in the
Introduction.
By conflating implied and unenumerated rights, the Court has
created rights that, although fundamental, are not inferable based on a
reasonable reading of the text, and the Court has also disregarded the
Ninth Amendment, which states that the Constitution “shall not be
construed to deny or disparage other rights “retained by the people.” 77
The Ninth Amendment’s language means what it says: fundamental
rights exist independently of the Constitution’s text, and citizens are
entitled to full enjoyment of those rights. These fundamental rights are
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities.
To be sure, it is not sufficient to say that the democratic process
75.
76.
77.
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should be the source of unenumerated rights. If the states were given
plenary power to create unenumerated rights through the democratic and
political process, they would also have the power to recognize none at
all. For example, a state could pass legislation refusing to recognize any
rights other than those contained in the Bill of Rights and thereby write
the Ninth Amendment out of existence.
As discussed below, if states decided to enforce the federal/state
citizenship dichotomy established in the Slaughter-House Cases, 78 this is
precisely what could and, in some states, would happen. This problem
highlights the Court’s vital role in safeguarding citizens from arbitrary
deprivations of liberty by the states. The proper path, however, is
through the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
not the Due Process Clause. 79
Indeed, one must consider the two contexts within which the words
“privileges and immunities” are mentioned. Article IV states that “the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states.” 80 Broadly speaking, this provision
prevents states from discriminating against non-residents. 81 The
Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.” 82 When read together with the Ninth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities would seem to
include the fundamental unenumerated rights of all citizens if United
States citizenship were held to encompass, and not differ from, state
citizenship. In the Slaughter-House Cases, however, the Court reached
the opposite conclusion and made it all but impossible for the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to be a source of
unenumerated fundamental rights. 83

78. See infra Part D.
79. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. states in relevant part:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between
a state and citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
80. See U.S. CONST., art. IV.
81. See Aaron Y. Tang, Privileges and Immunities, Public Education, and the Case for
Public School Choice, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1138 (2011).
82. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
83. 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1872).
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The Slaughter-House Cases Created an Unworkable and Unjust
Distinction Between Federal and State Citizenship

The Court has refused to rely on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a source of fundamental rights. In the Slaughter-House
Cases, 84 the Court upheld a Louisiana law creating a state-supported
monopoly on the butchering of animals. 85 The Court rejected the
argument that the law created involuntary servitude and violated the
privileges and immunities of potential competitors, holding that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause “protects only those rights ‘which owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws.’” 86 As a result, “other fundamental rights—
rights that predated the creation of the Federal Government and that ‘the
State governments were created to establish and secure’—were not
protected by the Clause.” 87
The Court relied on the fact that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment referred to ‘the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States’” 88 whereas the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in Article IV referred to state citizenship. 89 In the
Court’s view, a broad reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
would “radically chang[e] the whole theory of the relations of the State
and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to
the people.” 90 For these reasons, the Court held that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protected only a limited number of rights, such as the
right “to come to the seat of government to assert any claim [a citizen]
may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have
with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, [and] to engage in
administering its functions . . . .” 91 Four Justices dissented and argued
that the Court’s opinion reduced the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
“a vain and idle enactment.” 92 The dissenters would have construed the
Clause to protect “rights that are ‘in their nature . . . fundamental,’
including the right of every man to pursue his profession without the

84. Id.
85. Id. at 82-83.
86. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010) (quoting the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. at 79).
87. Id. (quoting the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 76).
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 75.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 756.
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imposition of unequal or discriminatory restrictions.” 93
The Court has never overturned the Slaughter-House Cases,
although it has suggested in dicta that the Clause may safeguard some
fundamental liberties. In Saenz v. Roe, 94 the Court invalidated a
California statute that limited the amount of welfare benefits that new
residents could receive. 95 The Court held that the statute infringed on
non-residents’ fundamental right to travel, which included “the right of a
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State . . . and, for those
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated
like other citizens of that State.” 96
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment
safeguarded a non-resident’s right to enter another state and receive
equal treatment under the law. 97 Justice Stevens explained that the right
to travel includes “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave
another State . . . and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.” 98
Although the protections afforded by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause “are not ‘absolute,’” 99 it prohibits discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.” 100 Justice
Stevens held that California’s interest in saving money, although
legitimate, could not be used as a vehicle to violate “the right of the
newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by
other citizens of the same State.” 101
93. Id. (quoting the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96-97 (Field, J., dissenting)).
94. 526 U.S. 489.
95. Id. at 500.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 501 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868)) (holding that “without
some provision . . . removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other
States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have
constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now
exists”).
98. Id.
99. Id. (internal citation omitted).
100. Id. at 502 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
101. Id. at 503. Justice Stevens further stated:
Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority
and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter–House Cases it has always been common
ground that . . . one of the privileges conferred by this Clause “is that a citizen of the
United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by
a bonâ fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.
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Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the Slaughter-House Cases
should be overruled and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is a
legitimate source of fundamental rights. Thomas wrote that, “[u]nlike the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, which have assumed neartalismanic status in modern constitutional law, the Court [has] all but
read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution.” 102
Justice Thomas relied on history and original intent of the Founders, 103
which showed that all citizens “which . . . dwell and inhabit within every
or any of the said several Colonies . . . shall HAVE and enjoy all
Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities . . . as if they had been abiding and
born, within this our Realme of England.” 104 As Justice Thomas
explained, “the terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ (and their
counterparts) were understood to refer to those fundamental rights and
liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by
all persons. 105 In addition, Thomas relied on a passage written by Justice
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 106 to support the argument that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected unenumerated fundamental
rights:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities that are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however,
be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole . . . . These, and many others which might be mentioned, are,
107
strictly speaking, privileges and immunities . . . .

Id.
102. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of
“Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
295, 320 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence,
however, pragmatic, is simply not a principled and faithful reading of the constitutional text.”).
103. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 522.
104. Id. at 523 (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 524.
106. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
107. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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In fact, when the Framers adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, one
senator quoted Corfield at length when explaining the purpose of the
Clause. 108
In rejecting the federal/state citizenship dichotomy, Thomas relied
on the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.” 109 Thomas also cited language in the Amendment
providing that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” 110
A natural reading of this language suggests that rights recognized by the
federal government must also be recognized—or certainly not infringed
without adequate justification—by the states.
Although Justice Thomas viewed the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a source of unenumerated rights, he believed that the Clause
should be construed narrowly to protect only a limited number of
rights. 111 In his view, a broad construction of the Clause would
impermissibly expand the Court’s power to create new rights:
Although the majority appears to breathe new life into the Clause today, it fails to address its historical underpinnings or its place in our
constitutional jurisprudence. We should also consider whether the
Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence. The majority’s failure to consider these important questions raises the specter that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause will become yet another convenient
tool for inventing new rights, limited solely by the “predilections of
112
those who happen at the time to be members of this Court.”

Justice Thomas’s view is not a reason to reject the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a source of unenumerated rights. The issue of
whether a specific provision in the Constitution gives the Court authority
to create new rights is separate from the issue of whether workable
standards can be identified to ensure that the exercise of this authority is
appropriately constrained. In fact, Justice Thomas made that distinction
108. Id. at 526; see also David R. Upham, Corfield v. Coryell and The Privileges and
Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (2005) (discussing the various
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
109. Id.
110. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
111. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527 (stating that the “privileges or immunities of citizens were
fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law”).
112. Id. at 527-28 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
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in his dissent, arguing that the Clause should be the source of
unenumerated rights but be applied narrowly to create very few new
rights. 113 Thus, given that the Court has developed such standards in its
substantive rights jurisprudence, there is no reason to suggest that a
framework more closely tied to the text will lead to judicial
overreaching. 114 For example, in determining whether to designate a
right as fundamental, the Court has considered “the ‘traditions and
(collective) conscience of our people’ to determine whether a principle is
‘so rooted . . . as to be ranked as fundamental’ . . . [and] is of such a
character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.” 115 What it will do, however, is enhance the
Court’s institutional legitimacy and reflect a commitment to a decisionmaking process that remains within the bounds of the Court’s Article III
power.
Ultimately, the federal and state citizenship dichotomy
recognized in the Slaughter-House Cases could, absent a ruling by the
U.S. Supreme Court, permit states to disregard fundamental liberties
enumerated in the Constitution and implied by the federal courts. For
example, the federal component of citizenry might provide citizens with
a right to same-sex marriage, but the state aspect could prevent citizens
from enjoying those rights. This is an odd and certainly unjust state of
affairs, particularly because the Framers likely would not have drafted
the Bill of Rights with the intent to give states the power to nullify
decisions by the federal courts and disregard the Ninth Amendment
altogether.
Ironically, the Court’s unreasonably narrow interpretation of the
Privilege or Immunities Clause has led it to create broad unenumerated
rights through the Due Process Clause, even though the justification for
doing so is far less compelling. The text of the Clause states that “no
state shall deprive citizens of life, liberty or property without due
process of law,” 116 which protects citizens from arbitrary or unfair
113. See David C. Durst, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Future of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U. TOL. L. REV. 933, 956 (2011).
114. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that fundamental rights
are those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “fundamental to the
Americanscheme of ordered liberty”) (internal citation omitted).
115. Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1215, 1221 (1990) (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Powell v. Ala., 287
U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
116. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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procedures. 117 Nonetheless, the Court has held that “[a]lthough a literal
reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures
by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105
years . . . the Clause has been understood to contain
a substantive component.” 118 This has engendered substantial criticism
from legal scholars who have called substantive due process “an
ungainly concept,” 119 and “a contradiction in terms,” 120 akin to “green,
pastel redness.” 121 As Justice Thomas argued in Saenz, “the demise of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to
the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.” 122
This is not to say that the rights recognized under the substantive
due process doctrine are unworthy of being fundamental. For example,
the right to terminate a pregnancy, to make consensual sexual choices,
and to refuse unwanted medical treatment are central to autonomy and
personal liberty. 123 Laws abridging these rights are—like the distinction
between federal and state citizenship—are inimical to a society premised
on equality and self-determination. It is to say that the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause are more legitimate
sources of these rights because the Founders intended them to protect
substantive unenumerated liberties.
III. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The Ninth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause can provide the Court with a credible basis upon
which to create unenumerated rights that are distinct from implied rights,
that exist independently of the Constitution’s text, and that protect
117. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (holding that “[d]ue Process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
118. Planned Parenthood of Se.Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
119. CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 443
(Aspen 3d. ed. 2009).
120. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18
(1980)
121. Id.
122. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Kevin Maher,
Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel, and the Resurrection of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 107
(2001) (stating that, “[a]s a result of the Saenz decision, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has suddenly become a viable means for plaintiffs to challenge the
constitutionality of state legislation.”).
123. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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citizens against arbitrary deprivations of liberty.
A.

Justice Goldberg’s Reliance on the Ninth Amendment in Griswold

The Court’s tenuous path toward creating unenumerated rights is
the result of misplaced reliance on the Due Process Clause and of the
Court’s failure to rely on the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
In Griswold, perhaps the most important case to establish the
unenumerated right to privacy, the Court mentioned but did not rely
heavily on the Ninth Amendment. 124 Instead, the Court embraced a
broader formulation of implied rights, holding that “specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.” 125 The problem with
Griswold is that the Constitution’s “penumbras” are not anchored to any
specific provision in the text, much like the Court’s substantive due
process jurisprudence is not based on a workable standard of liberty.
Importantly, Justice Goldberg concurred in Griswold and criticized
the majority for failing to rely on the Ninth Amendment as the source of
an unenumerated, not an implied, right to privacy:
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first
eight constitutional amendments . . . . The Amendment . . . was introduced in Congress . . . and passed the House and Senate with little or
no debate and virtually no change in language. It was proffered to quiet
expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not
be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific
mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that others
126
were protected.

As Justice Goldberg explained, the purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was “to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of
the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a
negation in all others; and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases
implies an affirmation in all others.”127 Like Justice Washington in

124.
125.
126.
127.

Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 483-44.
Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 626-27 (5th ed. 1891)).
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Corfield, Justice Goldberg concluded that the Ninth Amendment was the
proper source upon which to protect individual liberty:
While the Ninth Amendment—and indeed the entire Bill of Rights—
originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, the subsequently
enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as well from
abridging fundamental personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment,
in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the
first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of
other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as
federal, infringement. In sum, the Ninth Amendment . . . lends strong
support to the view that the “liberty” protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or
the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first
128
eight amendments.

Simply put, the Framers did not intend “that the first eight
amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights
which the Constitution guaranteed to the people.” 129 Rather, there are
“fundamental personal rights . . . which are protected from abridgment
by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution.” 130 In Bowers v. Hardwick, 131 Justice Blackmun agreed
with this principle in dissenting from the Court’s opinion upholding a
Georgia statute that criminalized consensual sodomy. 132 Justice
Blackmun argued that the Ninth Amendment should be considered “one
of the specific constitutional provisions giving ‘life and substance’ to our
understanding of privacy.” 133
Ultimately, Justices Goldberg and Blackmun’s opinions are
consistent with a “residual rights reading” of the Ninth Amendment and
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 134 They
also recognize a meaningful distinction between implied and
unenumerated rights.
B.

The Ninth Amendment Protects Rights Independent of the Bill of
Rights
Although most agree that the Ninth Amendment protects rights not
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 496.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
McAffee, supra note 115, at 1221.
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enumerated in the Constitution, scholars continue to debate the
Amendment’s original meaning. 135 One view is that the Ninth
Amendment is a source of residual or negative rights that serve to limit
the power of government. 136 Other scholars view the Ninth Amendment
as a source of affirmative or positive rights, irrespective of whether those
rights further the interest in limited government. 137 One scholar
describes the residual rights view as follows:
It simply holds that, for the drafters of the Constitution, the scheme of
limited government embodied in the system of enumerated powers was
a means of reserving rights to the people. On this reading, the purpose
of the ninth amendment is to ensure these reserved rights—
what Madison called “the great residuum” of rights the people possessed under the unamended Constitution—against any adverse inference that might be drawn from the addition of a bill of rights . . .
the amendment’s purpose is limited to securing these reserved rights
and does not extend to securing unenumerated affirmative limitations
138
on the powers the Constitution granted to the federal government.

Consequently, the focus is “on preserving against any adverse
inference the mechanism of a government of limited powers whereby
these rights are retained.” 139 At the same time, the “conception of
‘rights’ . . . is inclusive enough to extend to a broad range of privileges
and prerogatives that modern thinkers would not typically identify as
moral or legal rights . . . [including] those individual rights that we
might call ‘fundamental’ and which the framers might have called
‘natural.’” 140 Put differently, the “rights secured residually are not an
exclusive category of interests distinct from the rights that might be
secured by affirmative limitations on government power.” 141
Advocates for the affirmative rights view contend that the Ninth
Amendment protects unenumerated rights regardless of whether they
operate to limit the power of government:
The new orthodoxy . . . holds that the ninth amendment refers to con135. See id.
136. Id. at 1220-21; see also Joseph F. Kadlec, Employing the Ninth Amendment to
Supplement Substantive Due Process: Recognizing the History of the Ninth Amendment and the
Existence of Nonfundamental Unenumerated Rights, 48 B.C. L. REV. 387 (2007); Mark C. Niles,
Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal
Autonomy Rights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 85 (2000).
137. McAffee, supra note 115, at 1222.
138. Id. at 1219-20.
139. Id. at 1221.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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stitutional rights as we generally think of them today—legallyenforceable, affirmatively defined limitations on governmental power
on behalf of individual claimants . . . the rights its adherents conceive
of are to be defined independently of, and may serve to limit the scope
of, powers granted to the national government by the Constitution. The
proponents of this reading for the most part contend that
the ninth amendment embodies the tradition of an unwritten fundamental law of constitutionally enforceable individual rights, most frequent142
ly including the right to privacy.

Notwithstanding the conceptual differences between supporters of
residual and affirmative rights, both view the Amendment as securing
rights that exist independently of the Bill of Rights. As one scholar
notes, the residual rights view “does not lack a meaningful ‘rights
focus,’” 143 but reflects the principle that, “for the drafters of the
Constitution, the scheme of limited government embodied in the system
of enumerated powers was a means of reserving rights to the people.” 144
In other words, implied and unenumerated rights are not
synonymous, and distinguishing between them will have a beneficial
impact on the Court’s institutional legitimacy. As stated above, under the
First Amendment the Court has recognized an implied right of
association, which is necessary to enable citizens to fully exercise the
core right to free speech. 145 In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court
has held that citizens have an implied right to effective and competent
counsel, which gives meaning to the textual guarantee of assistance of
counsel. 146 On the other hand, protecting citizens from deprivations of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law does not imply or
even remotely support a right to terminate a pregnancy or to make
142. Id. at 1222.
143. Id. at 1219.
144. Id.
145. See Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L. REV.
1071, 1077-78 (2012). Professor Tarkington explains the derivative nature of the right to associate
under the First Amendment:
The word “association” is not itself found in the Constitution. Although occasionally citing due process as the source of the right of association, the Court has generally held that
freedom of association derives from the First Amendment, which expressly protects
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition. The Court has explained that
the right of association is implied by these enumerated rights because it is essential to securing those other First Amendment rights, and, in fact, gives the enumerated rights ”life
and substance.” Thus, although freedom of association ”is not expressly included in
the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful.”
Id.
146. See U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
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consensual sexual choices. Certainly, these rights are not necessary to
ensure that states adopt fair procedures before depriving citizens of
liberty. Yet the right to reproductive freedom and sexual autonomy are
essential if citizens are to live in a free and autonomous society. The
problem is not in holding that they are fundamental rights. It is in relying
on the Due Process Clause as the textual basis for those rights,
particularly when the rights to abortion and consensual sexual conduct
are based on rights—privacy and liberty—that are themselves implied.
C.

Linking the Ninth Amendment to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause

The key to developing credible unenumerated rights jurisprudence
is linking the Ninth Amendment’s language—retention of other rights
not contained in the Constitution—to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause’s prohibition on “any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.” 147 This approach will allow
the Court to abandon its much-maligned substantive due process
jurisprudence 148 while preserving its counter-majoritarian role to ensure
that the democratic process is not a vehicle by which the states can
infringe express, implied, or unenumerated rights. Simply stated, the
substantive due process doctrine was the wrong path by which to create
unenumerated rights, and the Court’s current reluctance to create such
rights is an outgrowth of this failed jurisprudence. 149
147. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
148. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, The Wolves and the Sheep of Constitutional Law: A Review
Essay on Kermit Roosevelt’s The Myth of Judicial Activism, 23 J.L. & POL. 1, 16 (2007). Professor
Sandefur describes the arguments against substantive due process as follows:
One of the primary targets of the Progressive critique of the judiciary was substantive
due process theory. This made sense, because due process was an area of the law where
the normative claims of America’s constitutional order had been most obviously asserted. The famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis are the artifacts of this conflict: they
and their allies contended that the Lochner-era Court was implementing normative theories “which a large part of the country does not entertain” and that the Constitution was
not intended to implement any consensus about right and wrong—instead, it is “made for
people of fundamentally differing views” who negotiate for political power in the state.
The Due Process Clause should therefore not be used to enforce outdated notions of justice, but instead should be seen as a flexible guarantee of some type of procedural regularity. In fact, Holmes regarded the Due Process Clause as “the usual last resort” for
those who had no real argument. In his view, the Clause required merely that a legislature enact the statute permitting it to do the complained-of act, or that a court follow a
regular procedure when enforcing it. That this allowed the legislature to determine (or
eliminate) the limits on its own authority was considered irrelevant.
Id.
149. See, e.g., Niles, supra note 136.
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Moreover, relying on the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would not transform unenumerated rights into
implied rights because neither protects specific substantive liberties like
the Bill of Rights’ first eight amendments. Additionally, it would not
lead to the evisceration of rights currently recognized under the Court’s
due process formulation. 150 The Privileges or Immunities Clause would
still guarantee “more than fair process, as the ‘liberty’ it protects
includes more than the absence of physical restraint.” 151 It would also
provide “heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” 152 This would include,
but not be limited to, the right to marry, to have children, to control the
education of one’s children, to make consensual sexual choices, to use
contraception, to bodily integrity, and to refuse medical treatment. 153 As
a result, the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause
would include the implied rights already recognized by the Court and lay
the groundwork for recognizing other unenumerated rights that are
implicit in a free an autonomous society.
Ironically, this approach could garner the support of both
originalists and living constitutionalists. 154 The text and purpose of the
150. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental
Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 795 (1996)
(discussing the various interpretive theories that the Court has used when recognizing new rights
under the Constitution).
151. Washington v. Glucksberg, 721 U.S 702, 719-20 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (the Due Process Clause “protects individual liberty against
‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”).
152. Id. at 720 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)).
153. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marriage); Skinner v. Okla. ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to have children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(right to control the education of one’s children); Griswold v. City of Chicago, 381 U.S. 479 (right
to use contraception); Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (right to make consensual sexual choices;
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (bodily integrity); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (right to abortion); Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S
261 (1990) (right to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
154. See Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMM.
353, 357-61 (2007). The differences between originalism and living constitutionalism are based on
disagreements about the manner in which the text should be interpreted:
In summary, a core difference between the originalists and the living constitutionalists
turns on what we might call interpretative mechanics—and Balkin aligns himself with
the originalist form. Originalists exclude many “extrinsic” constitutional modalities in
their first pass at any particular constitutional question; living constitutionalists let it all
in from the start. Discussions of consequences, underlying principles of political morality, prudence, doctrine, rule of law considerations: all these are relevant (even if not, perhaps, equally relevant) for living constitutionalists at the first moment that a question
of constitutional interpretation presents itself. Originalists either rule these considerations out of the interpretive game entirely or admit them only in later conceptual stages
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Ninth Amendment is to protect unenumerated fundamental rights, and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is “understood to refer to those
fundamental rights and liberties specifically enjoyed by English citizens
and, more broadly, by all persons.” 155
On its face, the Privileges or Immunities Clause appears to protect a
category of fundamental rights (called “Privileges or Immunities”)
from abridgment (“lessening”) by the making or enforcing of any state
law . . . it seems as if it protects fundamental rights, however derived,
from abridgment . . . . The historical evidence suggests that the framers
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, in fact, thought the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was the most important Clause in the
156
amendment.”

Indeed, an “[e]xamination of the history of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause confirms that this is in fact how the Clause should be
read.” 157 As the Court noted before deciding the Slaughter-House Cases,
the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits any state from abridging the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, whether its
own citizens or any others.” 158
Ultimately, establishing three categories of rights under the
Constitution would enable the Court to fully protect enumerated and
unenumerated rights while remaining faithful to the Constitution’s text
and the democratic process. Under this proposed framework, the Court
would have the authority to create implied rights that are based on
reasonable interpretations of the Constitution’s text, that reflect the
underlying purposes and historical understandings of particular
enumerated rights, and that account for circumstances that the founders
could not have foreseen. In addition, the Court would have the power to
create unenumerated rights by relying on the text of the Ninth
Amendment and Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than by
inventing questionable legal doctrines such as substantive due process.
In so doing, the Court can have a meaningful role in ensuring that state
and federal laws do not infringe on individual liberty while

of the interpretive enterprise.
Id.
155. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s
Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1097, 1109
(2004).
157. Id.
158. Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870).
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simultaneously respecting principles of federalism and adhering to the
checks that the Constitution envisions for the judicial branch.
IV. CONCLUSION
The failure to link the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause for the purpose of creating unenumerated
fundamental rights has been a persistent but rarely discussed aspect of
the Court’s jurisprudence. That should change. There need not be an
ongoing tension between the Court counter-majoritarian role and the
authority of states to govern through the democratic process. If the
Constitution’s text gives the Court a solid foundation upon which to
recognize new rights and thereby create a more just society, then the
exercise of that power is fundamentally democratic. The Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that path
and, ironically, results in a process of decision-making that is fairer than
the Court’s current due process jurisprudence.
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